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The politics of democracy and the 
global institutions:  




One of the great paradoxes of our age is the simultaneous omnipresence 
and absence of democracy. Wars are fought and justified in its name yet, 
as global markets and institutions expand their reach and influence, the 
power of nation states and their communities is diminished. Democracy 
is all at once everywhere and nowhere, as market imperatives facilitated 
by global institutions, but not communities and their representatives, 
determine national and local policy. In this chapter I explore the 
mechanisms through which global institutions generate broad social 
support for their policies. Focusing in particular on the most influential 
institutions, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO),1 I argue that these seek 
to construct not just national policy, but communities themselves, 
effecting their disciplined inclusion into the globalised, market-driven 
development project.
I begin the chapter by examining the rise of the World Bank, the IMF 
and the WTO. I highlight the principal policies of these institutions, 
together with their now well-documented social and political impacts. 
I then go on to explore how, in the face of increasing challenges to 
their legitimacy, these institutions have sought to engage civil society 
groups and their constituent communities as ‘partners’ in managing 
and mitigating the social fallout accruing from their policies. Drawing 
on the global institutions’ own discourses, I next demonstrate how this 
‘third way’ for the ‘Third World’2 depoliticises civic engagement and 
community practice as it necessarily obfuscates the links between local 
issues and macro-level policies by embarking on an ambitious project of 
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social engineering which seeks to redefine civil society and its agency. 
Drawing on some of my own experiences and conversations with 
civic groups and activists, I finally demonstrate the limits to this social 
engineering approach as communities, angry at their marginalisation 
and exploitation, either resist engagement in the global development 
project or, by maximising the opportunities provided by its new policy 
institutions, demand more effective representation from their civic 
leaders within it. I conclude with some lessons and challenges for 
community development in this regard.
Towards the Washington Consensus: the rise of the World 
Bank, the IMF and the WTO
The World Bank and the IMF were established by the Allies towards 
the end of the Second World War at Bretton Woods in the US with 
the aim of preventing a repeat of the economic collapse of the 1930s, 
which had constituted one of the principal drivers of the war. Although 
constitutionally part of the United Nations (UN) system, the Bretton 
Woods Institutions (BWIs), as they are also known, operated in a 
significantly different manner from the start. While decisions are made 
in the UN system on a one-country, one-vote basis,3 decision-making 
power within the BWIs is based on financial contributions. Thus, the 
US holds the greatest share of voting power, followed up by a number 
of European countries.4 The IMF was to provide short-term loans, 
thereby supporting an orderly international monetary system, while the 
World Bank was devised to provide long-term loans for reconstruction 
after the war. At first, the BWIs’ activities were confined to Europe 
and they provided loans to Denmark, France and the Netherlands in 
the aftermath of the Second World War. However, the breakdown in 
the early 1970s of the system of fixed exchange rates followed by the 
global debt crisis in the early 1980s resulted in a sudden and significant 
increase in their remit globally (Helleiner, 2011).
The forerunner to the WTO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) was also set up after the Second World War, again in 
part to avoid a return to the 1930s-style trade wars between the major 
powers, which triggered the recession[[Is this correct or should it 
be ‘depression’?]]. However, as time evolved, the GATT developed 
increasing levels of rules and regulations, which marginalised poorer 
member states within the global trading system. The upgrading of 
GATT to the WTO in 1995 brought to public attention a number of 
these issues, with the Seattle ministerial meeting in 1999 collapsing 
amid public protests. Multiple rounds of negotiations and talks since that 
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time have ended in deadlock as wealthy countries refuse to capitulate 
to Southern states’ demands for fairness. According to Green (2012: 
260–3), four key issues mitigate against fair trade within the WTO 
today. First, trade rules allow wealthy states to use tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to keep Southern states’ exports out of lucrative markets. 
Second, the WTO continues to support agricultural trade subsidies 
in Northern countries, thus making it harder for poor producers to 
compete. Third, trade rules oblige some Southern countries to reduce 
tariffs, removing a key source of government revenue and protection 
of fledgling indigenous industry. And fourth, patenting laws under the 
WTO restrict Southern countries from accessing new technologies 
and innovations, as well as from developing indigenous industries. 
Thus, while the WTO claims that the institution ‘provides a forum 
for negotiating agreements aimed at reducing obstacles to international 
trade and ensuring a level playing field for all’ (WTO, 2014: n.p.), in 
practice these agreements tilt the playing field heavily in favour of its 
wealthy member states and their interests.
While attempts to inject some degree of fairness into the rules and 
regulations of the WTO appear to have been caught in a stalemate 
since the mid-1990s, its ideological sisters – the World Bank and the 
IMF – have gone from strength to strength over recent decades. Their 
big break came with the debt crisis of the 1980s. Caught in a vicious 
trap of escalating interest rates combined with collapsing commodity 
prices due to the global recession, countries in Africa, Latin America 
and Asia, having borrowed heavily during the petrodollar boom of the 
1970s, found themselves increasingly unable to service the considerable 
debts they held with Northern commercial banks. With Mexico’s threat 
of default in 1982 threatening to destroy these banks and bring down 
the global financial system, the IMF and World Bank stepped in. The 
loans of the large commercial banks were transferred over to the BWIs, 
which then set about a joint process of rescheduling and further lending 
to ensure debtor countries maintained liquidity, thereby maintaining 
repayments and stabilising the global financial system. In return, the 
two institutions demanded far-reaching economic reforms in debtor 
countries, packaged in the form of structural adjustment policies.
Designed to a common template within the BWI offices in 
Washington (and therefore dubbed the ‘Washington Consensus’) and 
steeped in the anti-statist, free-market ideology of the time, structural 
adjustment policies aimed at stabilising economies and attracting inward 
investment by – in line with WTO rulings – removing controls on 
investment and barriers to trade; boosting foreign exchange earnings 
by promoting exports; and reducing government deficits by severe cuts 
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in public expenditure (Phillips, 2011). As we now know, the results 
were extremely damaging – economically, but most particularly socially 
and politically. One of the largest reviews – carried out by a group of 
academics, trade unions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
across 12 countries (SAPRIN, 20025) – uncovered the following results:
•	 Trade liberalisation led to growing trade deficits. Transnational 
corporations were typically the principal benefactors.
•	 Financial sector liberalisation resulted in financing going to large (and 
generally urban) firms run by a small number of local business elites.
•	 Labour market reforms resulted in more lax labour regulations and 
increased unemployment.
•	 The privatisation of public services resulted in poorer-quality and higher-
priced services, effectively driving them out of the reach of the poor.
•	 Public expenditure cuts, including widespread redundancies within 
the public sector, together with the removal of subsidies on basic 
foodstuffs and staples led to widespread hunger and poverty, in many 
cases culminating in angry and violent ‘food riots’ on the streets.
In short, the results were devastating. As the Executive Director of 
the United Nations Children’s Fund noted in his Foreword to the 
agency’s landmark critique, Adjustment with a Human Face, at the 
time: ‘As is too often the case during times of economic recession, a 
disproportionate share of suffering was borne by those least equipped 
to combat the effects of poverty – the most vulnerable of the poor, 
including children and women’ (UNICEF, 1987: 3). If all of this sounds 
familiar, it is perhaps because, notwithstanding widespread criticism 
from academics, development agencies and civic groups alike, little of 
the overall economic policy framework of the Washington Consensus 
has changed since that time. What has changed, however, is the strategy 
for its dissemination with, as the following section outlines, civic actors 
now accorded a central role in this strategy.
From Washington to Post-Washington Consensus: a third 
way for the ‘Third World’?
As noted above, the hegemonic position of the Washington Consensus 
had begun to run into serious trouble by the beginning of the 1990s, 
as empirical evidence mounted which illustrated the failures – in social 
and political, but also in economic terms – of the market-based reforms 
espoused. One of its most vocal, and arguably influential opponents 
at the time was the World Bank’s former Chief Economist and Nobel 
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prize winner, Joseph Stiglitz. Stiglitz (2008) argued that the intellectual 
doctrine of the Washington Consensus was too simplistic, being based 
on simple accounting frameworks and just a few economic indicators 
which were administered by technocratic economists with no regard 
to the context specificities of individual countries. He was strongly of 
the view that development policies should no longer be drawn up in 
the BWI offices in Washington, but that countries themselves should 
be the authors of their own policies.
In a series of high-profile addresses and presentations throughout 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, Stiglitz proposed a range of reforms to 
the Washington Consensus policy framework. These reforms formed 
the basis of what became known as the Post-Washington Consensus 
(PWC) – although, as we will see, the degree to which these represent 
a step forward or simply more of the same remains questionable. Stiglitz 
(2008: 53–4) identified the key tenets of this PWC as follows:
•	 the need for country- and context-specific development policies 
given that the ‘one size fits all’ models as advocated by the BWIs 
have failed;
•	 the involvement of developing countries themselves in the 
elaboration of these development plans, rather than drawing these 
up in Washington;
•	 some flexibility around the requirement for rapid liberalisation as 
there is no consensus that this, most particularly in countries with 
high unemployment, leads to faster economic growth;
•	 the inclusion of distributional issues and measures to reduce poverty 
in development planning. 
In principle therefore, it seemed as though the PWC represented a 
significant shift away from the neoliberal tenets of the Washington 
Consensus, affording countries the space to formulate their own 
policies while paying heed to issues of distribution and poverty 
reduction. In practice, however, it soon became apparent that what the 
BWIs had in mind were the same macro-economic prescriptions, with 
two additional add-ons. The first was a policy add-on in the form of 
social safety nets which, taking various forms but generally involving 
externally funded projects and programmes, aimed at protecting 
the most vulnerable from the harshest impacts of the market-driven 
policies. The second, mirroring the popular ‘third way’ (Giddens, 
2000) in Northern (particularly Anglophone) countries, involved 
determined efforts to foster close working relations with new ‘partners’ 
in development, community and civil society organisations (CSOs), 
The politics of democracy and the global institutions
186
Politics, power and community development
nurturing these and building their ‘capacity’ to effectively manage and 
mitigate the social and political fallout of market-driven policies, while 
in the process diffusing conflict and rebuilding popular legitimacy and 
support for the globalised development project.
Unsurprisingly therefore, and once again reflecting the outdatedness 
and analytical redundancy of the pernicious dichotomies of ‘the West 
and the Rest’ or ‘Us and Them’ or ‘First World/Third World’, criticisms 
of both the PWC and ‘third way governance’ resonate strongly with 
each other. Reflecting on the policy content of the new PWC 
dispensation, Öniş and Şensis (2005) argue that it fails to provide a 
sufficiently broad framework for dealing with key development issues 
such as income distribution, poverty and self-sustained growth. Lesay 
(2011) concurs, arguing that despite its harsh critique of prevalent 
economic policies and the model of economic development, the 
PWC still steers clear of proposing any fundamental alternative to 
the old capitalist model. Such ‘policy conservatism’ also underpins 
critiques of UK and US models of ‘third way governance’ (see, for 
example, Campbell and Rockman, 2001: 46). As Wetherly (2001: 150) 
notes, ‘the modern world is one in which there are no alternatives to 
capitalism’, therefore the ‘third way governance’ and welfare reforms 
(social safety nets in PWC parlance) it espouses fail to adequately 
address the problems created by the very system they seek to support.
In short, therefore, the principal function of what we might term 
the ‘third way Post-Washington Consensus approach’ has been to 
build popular legitimacy for the ongoing globalised capitalist project, 
despite its inherently inequitable outcomes. Key and necessary allies 
in this endeavour have been a range of civic associations representing 
a reconfigured civil society, engineered and ‘capacitated’ to partner 
with global institutions and their interests in effecting the disciplined 
inclusion and participation of communities in this global capitalist 
project. In the following section I take a closer look at the discursive and 
institutional mechanisms through which this engineering takes place.
Politics out, capacity building in: reconfiguring and 
engineering civil society
From the 1990s forward, this newly branded (post-)Washington 
Consensus has been carefully and strategically promoted both 
discursively and institutionally by the BWIs. Discursively, it has been 
promoted in three ways. The first has involved the rediscovery of and a 
renewed interest in poverty. Thus, following a distinct market bias in the 
thematic foci of the influential World Bank annual World Development 
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Reports (WDRs) throughout the 1980s,6 the 1990 WDR focused 
on poverty. However, poverty was framed in this and subsequent 
reports as a function of internal, domestic factors and policies rather 
than externally imposed policies7 (see World Bank, 1989: chapter 2). 
The second discursive feature of the PWC lies in the World Bank’s 
construction of the poor as somewhat helpless victims in a harsh world 
of poor internal governance, state ineptitude and corruption. Ignoring 
the overtly political, structuralist analyses of underdevelopment of the 
1960s and 1970s (see, for example, Frank, 1967) and neatly glossing 
over the critiques of the Washington Consensus, poor communities 
are constructed as requiring help and assistance. This construction 
is particularly apparent in the influential millennial WDR, Attacking 
Poverty, which, focusing on the capacities, opportunities and security 
of the poor, argues that ‘poor people are active agents in their lives, but 
are often powerless to influence the social and economic factors that 
determine their well-being’ (World Bank, 2001: 3). With a continued 
emphasis on the primacy of markets for poverty reduction (see chapter 
8) one of the central themes of this report is that the poor need help 
– in both participating in markets (2001: 61) and in mitigating the 
effects of market-induced shocks.
More recently, following the events of 9/11 in the US in 2001 and 
the attendant rise of the ‘failed state’ discourse as a justification for 
international intervention,8 poor communities are now also constructed 
as having a propensity to violence, therefore representing a security 
threat to more affluent Northern states and societies. As the World 
Bank states, ‘grievances can escalate into acute demands for change – 
and the risks of violent conflict – in countries where political, social, 
or economic change lags behind expectations’ (World Bank, 2011: 5). 
Such constructions are not just demeaning and insulting to Southern 
communities,9 they are also dangerous and divisive in that, in failing 
to provide the structural context for grievances and conflict, they 
induce prejudice and racism among the Northern media and general 
public. With poor communities now constructed as victims of inept 
governance with worrisome propensities for violence, the ground is set 
for the third frame through which the PWC is promoted – paternalistic 
‘partnerships’ with community representatives and CSOs infused with 
discourses of empowerment, support and the ubiquitous ‘capacity 
building’. Within this discourse, the rich corpus of theorisation on 
civil society – from Hegel through to Gramsci and beyond – as a site 
of political contestation between different interest groups is ignored; 
development problems are now reframed as technical inadequacies 
rather than the outcome of differential power relations and interest 
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politics; and civil society is reconfigured or engineered as the new 
‘magic bullet’ within this apolitical developmental dispensation.
This reconfiguration assumes three aspects. First, CSOs are 
reconfigured as apolitical ‘partners’ in the global market-driven 
development project, complementing rather than questioning or 
opposing the efforts of other mainstream actors. This is reflected in 
the Busan declaration of 2011,10 which defines CSOs as ‘independent 
development actors in their own right, whose efforts complement those 
of public authorities and the private sector’. Second, their new political 
PR (public relations) role is to build public support and legitimacy 
for BWI reforms and policies. The IMF, for example, which since the 
1990s has sought to engage CSOs in dialogue, views CSO engagement 
as a way of ‘strengthening country ownership of policies, which is 
essential to successful stabilisation and reform. Constructive dialogue 
with CSOs can help build mutual understanding and increase support for 
reform’ (IMF, 2013: n.p., emphasis added). The important role CSOs 
can play in building support for the Fund’s work is reflected in the 
Managing Director’s decision, in 2003, to publish and distribute to all 
staff a Guide for Staff Relations with Civil Society Organisations. Within 
this guide, staff are warned that ‘Some CSOs harbour considerable 
suspicion about the IMF and blame the institution for many ills’. 
Staff are thus advised that ‘It is usually better to focus discussions on 
finding and consolidating common ground rather than emphasising 
clashing interpretations and prescriptions’. Staff are further reminded 
that IMF policies are not open to influence from these CSO groups: 
‘CSOs may have unrealistic expectations regarding the degree that 
contacts with Fund staff will influence policy. The fact that staff are 
open to discussions with CSOs should not be misconstrued to mean 
that the IMF will necessarily adopt their positions’ (IMF, 2003: n.p.).
Third, CSOs are expected to draw communities into the globalised 
development project through a form of disciplined inclusion which 
promotes communities’ own responsibilities for plugging the gaps and 
managing the social fallout of this project. This role is heavily promoted 
by both the World Bank and the European Union – the latter now one 
of the major global institutions in international development.11 In the 
Foreword to its 2003 WDR, which focuses on service provision, the 
World Bank confidently declares: ‘Services work when they include 
all people, when girls are encouraged to go to school, when pupils and 
parents participate in the schooling process, when communities take charge 
of their own sanitation’ (World Bank, 2003: xiv, emphasis added). The 
reason for poor service provision, according to the report, is nothing 
to do with skewed priorities, but rather internal governance issues. 
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Community groups therefore have a key role to play in the monitoring 
and oversight of service provision – employing ‘technical’ instruments 
such as budget monitoring, report cards, service delivery satisfaction 
surveys and so on – all of which necessitate ‘capacity building’ training. 
With communities and civic groups thus mobilised in the delivery and 
oversight of social services, the way is clear for the Bank to focus on 
the broader macro picture – as reflected in the report of the following 
year – Improving the Climate for Investment. Since 2002, the Bank has 
developed ‘Community Driven Development’ (CDD) programmes, 
which support community management of safety net projects in 
a range of areas such as ‘water supply and sewerage rehabilitation, 
school and health facilities construction, nutrition programs for 
mothers and infants, rural access roads, and support for livelihoods 
and microenterprises’ (World Bank, 2014).
In recent years, through the European Commission (EC), the EU 
has developed what it calls ‘an enhanced and more strategic approach 
in its engagement with local CSOs’ (EC, 2012: 4). Echoing the PWC 
construction of CSOs, the EC (2012: 3) notes that ‘While states carry 
the primary responsibility for development and democratic governance, 
synergies between states and CSOs can help overcome challenges of 
poverty, widening inequalities, social exclusion and unsustainable 
development’. Mirroring World Bank discourse, the EC envisages a 
key role for CSOs in fostering ‘good governance’ through oversight on 
public spending and service delivery. Once again, therefore, through 
support to select ‘partner’ CSOs, the active inclusion of communities 
in the global, market-driven development project is the central focus 
of EU support. And, once again, this necessitates a depoliticisation of 
civic engagement, obfuscating the links between local issues and macro-
level politics and redefining civic activism in purely technocratic terms.
Such an ambitious engineering of both CSOs and, through these, 
communities themselves, has both a material and an ideological 
dimension. Materially, as we have seen, the reconfiguration and 
engineering is attained through select funding for particular service 
or safety net projects – as with the World Bank’s CDD above or EC 
funding. At an ideological level, two principal instruments are used. 
The first comes in the form of the ubiquitous ‘capacity building’ 
training workshops organised by donors for CSOs and, in turn, by 
CSOs for communities. This is justified, as we have seen above, by 
privileging technical, managerial capacities over analytical capacities. 
As the EC notes, ‘In order to increase their impact, local CSOs must 
overcome capacity constraints ranging from limitations in technical 
management and leadership skills, fundraising, to results management 
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and issues of internal governance’ (EC, 2012: 10). The second 
instrument is the range of new ‘participatory’ policy institutions at 
national and local levels which, as we will see, offer both constraints 
and opportunities to civic agency.
The two most widespread PWC policy institutions are the 
national-level Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) processes and 
local-level decentralisation structures. Developed in the late 1990s, 
PRS institutions were the PWC institutional mechanism whereby 
development policy formulation ostensibly moved from Washington 
to host countries themselves. Moreover, with their ‘poverty focus’ and 
emphasis on ‘broad-based participation’ (see World Bank, 2000), they 
were hailed as opening the political space to national governments and 
civic associations for dialogue and deliberation on alternatives to the 
Washington Consensus. Empirical studies reveal the results of PRS 
processes to be far more mixed, however, with, in many cases, the 
same policies and politics emerging as before (see, for example, Weber, 
2006; Zack-Williams and Mohan, 2006, for whom the PRS functions 
as an institutional framework for the inclusion of civic actors within 
the unchanged and unchanging neoliberal, development project). 
At more local levels, decentralised institutions, providing the same 
opportunities for local CSOs and communities to become involved in 
local policy deliberations and implementation, have also been heavily 
promoted since the 1990s. As with the PRS, although normatively 
hailed as opening up a policy space at local levels, empirical studies 
reveal them to be highly susceptible to elite capture (Chanie, 2007; 
Crawford and Hartmann, 2008).
While discourse proves a powerful tool of social engineering (due to 
its relative invisibility), institutions are arguably more malleable. The 
issue is therefore perhaps not so much how and in whose interests 
such PWC policy institutions perform, but why they do so and, 
more normatively, how they might be transformed to challenge the 
political and economic status quo. Clearly, a non-reflexive, uncritical 
engagement can result in cooption and the disciplined inclusion of both 
CSOs and the communities they purport to represent as highlighted 
above. By contrast, as we see below, a more critical engagement, 
informed by mediation with communities and constituents, highlights 
the limitations of this institutional and, ultimately, discursive PWC 
social engineering approach.
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The limits to social engineering: colonising spaces, 
demanding representation, resisting ‘participation’
The global institutions’ plans for their new civic ‘partners’ is flawed in 
one major respect. Rather unsurprisingly perhaps for undemocratic 
institutions, the BWIs have neglected the one key element central 
to the democratic legitimacy of civic organisations – representation. 
In its reconfiguration of civil society, the BWI project is premised 
on hierarchical, top-down relations within civil society, with civic 
leaders exercising control and influence over their constituents, thereby 
effecting their inclusion in the macro development project. Yet, as we 
know, civic and community leaders derive their legitimacy from their 
skills and abilities to mediate with and represent their constituents 
and communities, and not the BWIs. And so, while examples of 
the negative effects of the global PWC approach within community 
practice abound – paternalistic, technocratic approaches emphasising 
local responsibility and action divorced from the macro-policy 
environment and the motivations and actions of elite actors – a closer 
examination of its impact over time reveals more complex dynamics 
and outcomes.
A few examples from my own research over the years illustrate 
this. In Malawi, for example, the technical and ‘capacity’ exigencies 
of participation in the country’s first PRS process in the early 2000s 
resulted in an increasing professionalisation of civic actors engaged in 
the process. Having internalised the technocratic, problem-solving 
discourse dominant within PRS institutions, the principal CSO 
participating in the process attracted significant levels of international 
funding, which moved it away from community mobilisation and onto 
the PWC activities of budget monitoring and safety net provision. While 
prospering financially from this move, the CSO became increasingly 
divorced from its constituents. As this gap widened, constituents 
began to question, via local media and radio, the motivations and 
level of engagement of their leaders. A crisis of legitimacy for civic 
leaders ensued as they were charged with turning into yet another 
elite, urban-based CSO pandering to the exigencies of international 
donors. Faced with growing criticism across the media and within the 
Malawian public sphere more broadly, PRS civic actors were forced 
to redirect their energy and focus, and to develop and consolidate 
links with community groups across the country. The confluence of 
three factors – community groups demanding representation through 
their CSO at a national level; the fact that the CSO’s reputation 
and future now depended on this; and the fact that the BWIs’ own 
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somewhat shaky legitimacy rested on claims of ‘national ownership’ 
and ‘broad-based civic participation’ – resulted in, for a short time at 
least, a reopening and retransformation of Malawi’s PRS institutions 
(see Gaynor, 2010; 2011).
Somewhat analogously, in Burundi local civic and community groups 
have identified decentralised institutions as a strategic site for contesting 
the political marginalisation and exploitation of communities by donors 
and government alike. Having reappropriated the core concepts of 
accountability (downward, not upward) and participation (as voice, 
not cost-sharing through voluntary labour), they are working with 
local communities to prise open the political spaces created locally 
through decentralised structures and institutions (see Gaynor, 2014a; 
2014b). In Rwanda, where rapid economic development depends 
on a strong, highly authoritarian, top-down system of decentralised 
governance, community resistance to the increasing costs of state-
sponsored programmes, as articulated in community meetings and in 
confidential research interviews, is apparent, and the legitimacy of local 
political and coopted civic leaders is once more called into question 
(see Gaynor, 2015).
The ultimate outcome of each of these cases remains unknown 
and unknowable. Each represents an ongoing journey – of cooption 
and contestation – in the context of hegemonic development 
frameworks privileging elite, market-based interests over those of 
local communities. They highlight two fundamental points. First, 
that power relations are not static, but constantly changing – between 
different groups and within different institutions. It falls to civic 
representatives to strategically maximise the opportunities available 
and seize the power where and when they can. And second, that 
civic actors and community representatives are not passively coopted 
into these engineered spaces, as we are sometimes led to believe. By 
losing sight of the reasons they entered these spaces in the first place 
and losing touch with their constituents, they often allow themselves 
to be coopted, or, alternatively, remaining loyal to their roots, they 
resist and sometimes transform these spaces. With all our focus on the 
power, discourses and frameworks of global and national elites, we 
sometimes lose sight of the agency of the marginalised, in the process 
negating or ignoring this, and ultimately reproducing the stereotypes 
and caricatures of the victimised that are constructed and promulgated 
by the global institutions.
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Towards a conclusion: lessons and challenges for 
community development
In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate that the current ‘third 
way for the “Third World”’ promoted by the global institutions means 
little in terms of policy change, but everything in terms of democracy. 
Necessitating and actively promoting a fundamental reconfiguration 
of civic agency – from oppositional force to apolitical partner, it 
represents a highly ambitious project of social engineering, with 
potentially significant political repercussions. On the one hand, it risks 
further undermining democracy by coopting and reconfiguring key 
actors within the public sphere. On the other, both the discourses and 
institutions it has introduced potentially offer new opportunities for 
critically engaged groups and individuals to widen and transform the 
political space, challenging the very basis on which these institutions 
were founded.
Three issues are worth highlighting in this regard. First, language 
and discourse matter. A somewhat lazy, uncritical acceptance of the 
PWC’s depoliticised versions of the core concepts – ‘democracy’ 
(measured now in numbers rather than substance); ‘participation’ 
(active engagement in mitigating local problems arising from the global 
development project rather than critically interrogating their causes); 
‘partnership’ (on whose terms?); and ‘capacity’ (whose? To do what?) 
– leads to a somewhat lazy, uncritical acceptance of a dominant, yet 
socially dislocating global development framework. Second, institutions 
matter. Again, a somewhat lazy, uncritical engagement in any of the 
range of institutions on offer within the PWC framework may initially 
prove comfortable and financially lucrative to civic groups, but it may 
ultimately prove their Achilles heel as CSO legitimacy and capacity 
to represent their constituents comes increasingly into question. And 
third, neither institutions nor discourses are static. Both are a function 
of the power relations that circulate within and around them. In a global 
political economy which seeks to consolidate a hegemonic consensus 
for an elitist, market-driven development project, it falls to community 
and civic leaders to reconnect with their roots and, working with their 
communities, to step outside the globally dominant norms, institutions 
and frameworks to envision, imagine and articulate alternative social 
and political projects and futures.
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Notes
1 While the range of global institutions is vast and constantly expanding, I am focusing 
on these three institutions as, arguably, they have proven most influential over the past 
five decades.
2 I am using the term ‘Third World’ disparagingly as, rooted in modernist thinking, 
it implies a linear pathway to development while ignoring the structural causes of 
poverty and wealth. I also use other terms, such as Global South and North, with 
caution as they carry geographically specific connotations which ignore the coexistence 
of wealth and poverty within individual nations and regions.
3 With the exception of the UN Security Council.
4 See IMF (2015) for financial contributions of all IMF members.
5 The lengthy delay in the production of this report is an interesting story in itself. 
The report was commissioned by the World Bank in 1997. However the Bank, 
unhappy with the findings, sought to block publication. By the time the report was 
finally published (2002), the damage wreaked by these policies was widely known.
6 WDRs, which have been published annually since 1978, are the Bank’s flagship 
publication. Each year, the WDR focuses on a particular theme, outlining the Bank’s 
policy and thinking in this area. Given the Bank’s influence and resources, WDRs 
are highly influential in setting donor policy and agendas more broadly. 
7 While chapter 8 of the WDR 1990 acknowledges the significance of international 
policy in the areas of trade, aid and debt, it stresses that these can only work in poorer 
countries’ favour when they liberalise their trade and adopt conditions associated with 
debt relief and aid.
8 This discourse is deeply problematic in the case of African states where the Western 
norm of strong Weberian states (which took centuries to develop in Europe) has never 
existed and where innovative experiments in state building are ongoing.
9 While the links between poverty and conflict are now well established, the popular 
‘failed state’ index (The World Fund for Peace, 2013) is purely descriptive and makes 
no attempt to analyse the causes of marginalisation and/or grievance. 
10 The Busan declaration emerged from the 4th High Level Global Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness held from 29 November to 1 December 2011 in Busan, South Korea. 
The Forum brought together all major multilateral and bilateral donors and the 
declaration is thus reflective of the global consensus on aid issues, including the role 
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of CSOs. See www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/images/stories/hlf4/OUTCOME_
DOCUMENT_-_FINAL_EN.pdf.[[URL is not active. Please provide alternative]]
11 EU aid overseas now accounts for one and a half times that provided by the World 
Bank (Hout, 2010: 3).
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